Background. Disparity in access to liver transplantation (LT) in the United States persists despite directives from the federal government to reduce geographic variation. We assessed the impact of socioeconomic status (SES) and traveling to alternative donation service areas (DSAs) on patient survival. Methods. A prospective cohort study integrating transplant registry and U.S. Census data was analyzed using multivariate linear Cox proportional hazards models. A separate matched-pairs analysis was used to assess the benefit of traveling on patient survival and transplantation rate. Conclusion. High SES and inter-DSA travel are strongly associated with increased LT access and reduced mortality. Travelers are more likely to be sociodemographically advantaged and privately insured and to live in regions with reduced access to deceased-donor organs.
practice, and organ availability (8, 9) . Although there are restrictions on the distribution of the organs to sicker but more distant recipients, no similar restrictions exist for patients seeking care. Thus, current policy permits patients to be evaluated and listed at any transplant center they are able to reach expeditiously at the time of an organ offer. Access and outcomes have been demonstrated to vary across recipient gender, socioeconomic status (SES), rural versus urban residence, and racial/ethnic group (4, 10) . Although high SES impacts access to a variety of medical procedures, ensuring equitable access to LT is a major goal of the current organ allocation system and governing federal regulations (3, 11, 12) . This study examines the impact of SES on LT outcomes and, specifically, the transplantation rate and survival impact of relocation (''travel'') to a DSA with a relatively greater supply of deceased-donor organs.
RESULTS
From 2002 to 2009, 61,410 patients were placed on the LT waiting list and 32,940 received a deceased-donor LT. Transplant candidates and recipients were classified by SES strata based on their residential zip code (Tables 1 and 2) . Compared with the lowest SES strata, LT candidates living in the highest zip code SES strata were more likely to be male, white, older, college educated, employed, and privately insured. LT candidates in the highest SES strata were less likely to have diabetes, hepatitis C, and peripheral vascular disease. The distribution of recipient donor and transplant characteristics across SES groups among LT recipients was similar to that of candidates. LT recipients in the highest SES category were significantly more likely to have lower MELD score at transplantation ( Table 2) .
Effects of Socioeconomic Status Access to and Outcome After Liver Transplantation
Higher SES was associated with increased access to LT and decreased risk of death from ESLD (Table 3) . Compared with the lowest SES quartile, the three remaining SES quartiles showed a statistically significant 5% improvement in access to LT in multivariate models. More importantly, the likelihood of death was inversely related to SES strata (SES 2: adjusted hazard ratio [ . Other factors associated with LT access were male gender, white race, blood type other than O, hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) as primary diagnosis, higher MELD score, and travel. Death or removal from the waitlist was strongly associated with older age, gender, blood type O, hepatitis C and HCC, diabetes, hypertension, peripheral vascular disease, and MELD (Table 3) 
Effects of InterYDonation Service Area Travel on Access and Outcomes of Liver Transplantation
In the full, multivariate model, inter-DSA travel was strongly predicted by high SES, white race, gender, blood group O, and region at listing (Table 4) . Travelers were also less likely to have hypertension and peripheral vascular disease. Five years after listing, the cumulative incidence of inter-DSA travel for the lowest SES strata was 4% compared with 10.1% for the highest SES strata (Fig. 1) . Inter-DSA travel showed incremental increase among higher SES categories (Table 4) . Travelers also differed from nontravelers in other demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, and diagnosis). Travelers were more likely to have better compensated liver disease with a greater percentage of listing MELD scores below 20.
The incidence of travel varied markedly across regions and DSAs within individual regions. After adjusting for candidate characteristics, the incidence of travel was highest among candidates initially listed in region 1 from North Carolina to South Carolina) to areas that have improved access to organs. The most common states of origin were California (19.9% of travelers), New York (11%), Massachusetts (7.3%), and Pennsylvania (6.6%). The most common destination was Florida (28.5%).
Matched-Pairs Analysis
To account for changes in severity of illness, the travelers (n=1284) were matched 2:1 with newly listed controls (n=2563) in their original DSA who were similar in age, race, diagnosis including proportion of patients with HCC, and MELD score (see Table S1 , SDC, http://links.lww.com/TP/A729). Using multivariate Cox modeling to adjust for the remaining differences ( Fig. 2A) Fig. 2B ). Among patients who were transplanted, the travelers had a smaller increase in MELD score between 
DISCUSSION
In this retrospective analysis, we found a clear relationship between SES and improved survival among patients with ESLD. Patients with higher SES had better pretransplantation and posttransplantation survival. Furthermore, these patients were more likely to move to areas where access to the donor pool was improved. Our results suggest that patients who were able to travel had a 74% increased likelihood of transplantation resulting in a 20% reduction in the risk of death due to ESLD. Travelers were transplanted at lower MELDs with equivalentquality organs and had no significant differences in posttransplantation outcomes.
Previous evaluations of access to LT have demonstrated reduced rates of transplantation for minority candidates and females (4, 10) . Although racial and ethnic minority populations are more likely to have public insurance and be sicker at the time of listing, the MELD-based allocation system has significantly reduced the disparity in waitlist mortality for these patients within their local DSA (4). Differences in access based on gender, however, appear to have been exacerbated by the MELD system (4). Unfortunately, significant variation in organ supply and recipient demand is responsible for large, ongoing disparities in waiting list mortality, and transplantation rate across the United States (13) .
Patients with greater SES have improved access to and outcomes from a wide variety of healthcare interventions including transplantation (11, 12, 14Y18) . One potential difference between transplantation care and other medical specialties, however, is the presence of specific federal regulation designed to ensure equivalent access to the organ supply within existing allocation regions. Although the population of patients who chose to relist themselves at a different DSA after the initial listing is small (2Y3% of all listed patients), for some candidates, it permits them to use economic resources to gain an advantage in access to the deceased-donor organ supply. The inter-DSA travelers were significantly more likely to live in zip codes that are more affluent, have a MELD score between 15 and 20, and report fewer medical comorbidities than those who were not able to travel. Travelers were also more likely to be white, male, and college educated and have private insurance.
The high rate of travel for patients in the middle MELD score range (15Y20) reflects the substantial variation in access for these patients resulting from the current allocation system. In highly competitive regions, a MELD score in this range is unlikely to result in LT. Conversely, even in regions with a shortage, very high MELD patients (930) are likely to be transplanted. Similarly, very low MELD scores (G15) are often precluded from receiving organs even in regions with a better organ supply, given the share 15 rule that requires regional sharing of livers if there is no recipient with a MELD score below 15 within the DSA. Consistent with this hypothesis, the states with the highest MELD scores at transplantation (California, New York, and Massachusetts) contributed the largest proportion of the travelers. In contrast, regions with comparatively better organ supply such as Florida attracted the majority of the travelers. Posttransplantation survival was found to be unaffected by traveler status, after controlling for SES, despite the differences in MELD score at transplantation. This finding is consistent with the relatively poor correlation between MELD score at transplantation and posttransplantation outcome (19) .
LT expenditures increase with the MELD score at transplantation and reduction of organ quality (7, 9, 20, 21) . Thus, transplant centers that operate in DSAs with a better organ supply have the opportunity to provide less expensive care by transplanting less sick patients with better-quality organs. Conversely, in highly competitive DSAs, centers must accept high DRI organs for candidates with a high severity of illness, likely reducing center profitability. Therefore, centers located in DSAs that have a better organ supply can attract privately insured travelers who tend to be healthier and better insured and have fewer comorbid conditions. Centers in these DSAs benefit from the resulting cost-savings and have the opportunity to further reduce charges to payers attracting additional referrals. The conclusions of this study have several significant limitations due to the need to use large, registry databases. First, our study used neighborhood SES score versus individual SES score to characterize patients. However, neighborhood SES score has been demonstrated to provide a high degree of correlation with actual SES components in other analyses as well as the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) variables assessed here (11, 14, 22Y24) . In addition, approximately 2% of the candidates and recipients in the OPTN did not have a valid zip code. Second, we used calculated MELD rather than allocation MELD in the modeling of survival. Inclusion of HCC as a diagnosis within the model appears to reflect the majority of the improved access to transplantation resulting from MELD exception points (aHR [95% CI], 2.68 [2.59Y2.77]). Furthermore, HCC diagnoses were balanced in the matched-pairs analysis at baseline. It is possible that recipients chose to travel to more lenient regions based on regional review board definition; however, this decision, like that of a reduced average MELD at transplantation, is another reflection of the potential benefit of relocation.
Most significantly, our definition of inter-DSA travel is limited in its ability to identify LT candidates whose initial listing was already at distant DSA. Patients who were never listed at a local DSA are not captured in these data. We also did not include multiple listed patients who are maintained on two waiting lists. Given logistical difficulties in traveling to both centers, it is likely that this option is available only to candidates in a limited number of some geographic areas and thus may bias the sample by overrepresentation of certain regions (e.g., New York/New Jersey). Furthermore, in previous studies of dual listing, more than 75% of patients received their transplant at the second center of listing (995% if they transferred their time) (25) . Thus, it appears that our description of travel reflects actual practice and creates a highly reproducible, if overly narrow, definition of the cohort. Thus, the benefits observed here are likely to underestimate the true prevalence of transplant travel within the United States. The decision to travel to a distant DSA may reflect many factors, including employment changes, need for greater social support, or insurance company restrictions. Travelers may also be seeking unique clinical expertise that is available only at a distant center. However, the significant differences in SES and the marked increase in travel from DSAs with very high average MELD scores at transplantation suggests that organ accessibility may be a significant contributor to the decision to move.
In conclusion, ongoing geographic disparity in the supply of liver allografts has led to persistent differences in access to LT and waiting list mortality. Patients with greater resources and private health insurance appear to travel more frequently to get better access to transplantable organs than those with lower SES. This improved access is mediated, in part, through relocation of a selected group of well-insured, well-educated patients to centers in DSAs with less competition for transplantable organs. This movement of lower MELD patients to centers with better organs results in fewer organs available for regional sharing and creates the perception that access to the deceased-donor organ supply can be purchased by the wealthy. Broader allocation proposals, which seek to reduce geographic disparity in organ supply, may attenuate these effects by reducing the incentive to travel based on organ supply alone without restricting access for patients who travel in search of unique clinical skills.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data Source
Patients listed for or receiving a LT between 2002 and 2009 were identified in the OPTN/United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) Standard Transplant Analytic Research, which provides information on all donors, waitlisted candidates, and transplant recipients from OPTN member institutions in the United States (26) .
Exclusion Criteria
Patients with missing valid zip code of primary residence at listing were excluded from transplant access analyses (2.2%). Similarly, recipients without a valid residential zip code at transplantation were excluded from the posttransplantation outcomes analyses (2.4%). Candidates with assigned status 1, below 18 years old, receiving multiple organs beyond liver-kidney, or who were retransplant candidates were excluded.
Exposure Measures: Socioeconomic Status, Distance to Center, and InterYDonation Service Area Travel
For each OPTN residential zip code, a block-group level neighborhood SES index was computed using the 2000 U.S. Census data. The SES index score was calculated by a validated formula of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (27) . Patients were categorized by quartiles of SES scores (with 1 as the lowest and 4 as the highest).
Inter-DSA ''travel'' was defined as transfer of care from a center within the candidate's initial listing DSA to a center outside of this DSA. This limited definition requires patients to ''delist'' at their initial DSA and relist in a new DSA. Our definition of ''travelers'' excluded patients who lived in Texas and traveled to other DSAs in Texas, as examination of this cohort revealed that patients had markedly different demographic characteristics from the other travelers across the nation (see Table S2 , SDC, http://links.lww.com/TP/A729), reflecting a regional difference in transplantation practice.
Listing Model for End-Stage Liver Disease
For the transplant access analysis, we used calculated biological MELD score. This score excludes MELD exception points granted to patients with specific clinical conditions because access to these exceptions vary significantly as a function of regional review board actions.
We adjusted for time to access to transplantation among patients listed with HCC by including this diagnosis within the multivariate model.
Outcome Measures
The four primary outcomes of interest for transplant access analysis were (a) time from listing to transplantation, censored at the end of the study (November 2009); (b) death or removal from the waiting list due to illness; (c) death or removal from the waiting list due to illness, censored at end of the study; and (d) inter-DSA travel after initial listing, censored at death, waitlist removal due to illness, transplant, and end of the study. The three primary outcomes of interest for posttransplantation analysis were (a) cost of transplantation admission, (b) patient, and (c) death-censored graft survival censored at the end of the study.
Covariates
Covariates for regression models were selected from the baseline patient and donor demographic and clinical information obtained from UNOS/ OPTN candidate, donor, and transplant registration forms. DRI was defined using donor characteristics as described by Feng et al. (28) .
Matched-Pairs Analysis
To further validate the findings of the multivariate model, a matchedpairs analysis was completed using the entire UNOS database. Travelers who were identified using the definition above were matched to control patients 1:2 where possible. The controls were drawn from the DSA from which the traveler originated and then delisted when possible (97.9%). Thus, travelers were matched to newly listed controls in their DSA of origin with similar age, gender, race, and MELD score. Age was matched using a FIGURE 2. Access to transplantation comparing matched travelers and nontravelers: overall time to transplantation (A) and mortality (B). Time zero is the point of travel (travelers) or initial listing (nontravelers).
radius system (initially within 1 year if available at 35.4% and 2 years at 76.1%, capped at 5 years). Similarly, MELD scores were identical for 78.3% of controls and within 3 points for 95.8%. Overall, 2 cases were left unmatched and 10 cases had only one match. The incidence of HCC was equivalent in each group as was the proportion of patients transplanted with MELD exceptions (traveler 10.0% and cases 10.9%).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). Donor and recipient characteristics were compared among SES categories and travel status by chi-square test for categorical variables. The cumulative incidence of inter-DSA travel by SES status was estimated by Kaplan-Meier method. Multivariable Cox regression analysis was used to estimate associations between recipients and, where appropriate, donor characteristics with each of the study outcomes (overall mortality, access to transplantation, incidence of intra-DSA travel, and posttransplantation patient/graft survival). Multiple linear regression models were constructed to identify relationships between inter-DSA travel and the cost of transplant hospitalization.
In the United States, livers for transplantation are distributed within donation service areas (DSAs). In DSAs with multiple transplant centers, competition among centers for organs and recipients may affect recipient selection and outcomes in comparison with DSAs with only 1 center. The objective of this study was to determine whether competition within a DSA is associated with posttransplant outcomes and variations in patients wait-listed within the DSA. United Network for Organ Sharing data for 38,385 adult cadaveric liver transplant recipients undergoing transplantation between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2009 were analyzed to assess differences in liver recipients and donors and in posttransplant survival by competition among centers. The main outcome measures that were studied were patient characteristics, actual and risk-adjusted graft and patient survival rates after transplantation, organ quality as quantified by the donor risk index (DRI), wait-listed patients per million population by DSA, and competition as quantified by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI). Centers were stratified by HHI levels as no competition or as low, medium (or mid), or high competition. In comparison with DSAs without competition, the low-, mid-, and high-competition DSAs (1) In the United States, organs for transplantation are scarce resources. Patients on transplant lists are essentially in competition with one another through transplant centers, which represent the patients and commonly act as surrogate decision makers for the patients in decisions concerning patient and organ suitability. Transplant centers need to perform transplantation for patients at rates high enough to meet their fixed costs, to make incremental profits with each additional transplant, and to preserve their market share. These motives may conflict with decisions about the patients who should undergo transplantation, the best matching of organs with recipients, and, therefore, the best allocation of this scarce resource.
Under the current system for organ distribution employed in the United States, the national list is subdivided into regional and local units, and the local unit is called the donation service area (DSA). A DSA can be composed of 1 or more transplant centers; when there is more than 1 transplant center, the centers' patients are combined into a single list. When an organ becomes available, it is offered to patients ranked on a DSA list. In liver transplantation, the primary ranking of patients on these lists is done with the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score. 1 Patients with the highest scores are at the greatest risk of death and are the first to be offered organs that are offered within a DSA. When a transplant center is the only member of its DSA, it has no competition for an organ if the organ is used in a patient with a MELD score greater than 15. In a DSA with more than 1 transplant center, competition exists among the centers for an organ, and this may affect the use of the organ in comparison with its use within a DSA without competition. This competition may affect patient and organ selection, and the degree of competition could lead to different decisions by transplant centers. In this article, we examine empirically the effects of transplant center competition within DSAs.
PATIENTS AND METHODS
Data for adult deceased donor liver transplants between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2009 were obtained from the United Network for Organ Sharing (through Standard Transplant Analysis and Research files created on March 31, 2011) to evaluate the risks of graft loss and patient death by competition. Transplants occurring at children's hospitals or at centers with fewer than 7 transplants during the study period (equivalent to less than 1 transplant per study year) were excluded from the study.
The Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) was used to measure competition. The HHI for each DSA was calculated as the sum of the squares of market share for all centers within the DSA. The market share for a given center was defined as the proportion of liver transplants within the DSA performed at the given center from 2003 to 2009. The HHI was rescaled to 1 for this analysis. High HHI values indicated low competition, whereas low HHI values indicated high competition. We compared centers without competition to those with competition, but we segregated the latter into HHI tertiles to allow for comparisons between patients undergoing transplantation at centers with no competition (HHI ¼ 1.00), low competition (HHI ¼ 0.53-0.99), medium (or mid) competition (HHI ¼ 0.38-0.52), or high competition (HHI < 0.38). The DSAs in New York, Ohio, and Tennessee were covered under statewide sharing agreements during the time of this study and were combined into single DSAs including all active centers in the states. Two centers, Oregon Health and Sciences University and the Portland Veterans Administration Medical Center, act as a single center and were regarded as a single center for this analysis. The number of active transplant centers fluctuated by the calendar year, with 14 centers initiating liver transplantation and 6 centers eliminating liver transplantation. The volume at new centers (median number of liver transplants in the first year ¼ 4, range ¼ 1-21) and closing centers (median number of liver transplants in the final year ¼ 15, range ¼ 6-21) was relatively small, and this suggested a limited volume of liver transplants at these centers. The small numbers of center transitions and patients limited the feasibility of evaluating any effects and were, therefore, not assessed.
Frequency distributions and medians (with interquartile ranges) for recipient and donor characteristics were compared by no competition, low competition (high HHI values), mid competition (intermediate HHI values), or high competition (low HHI values). The covariates included those significantly associated with 1-year graft survival in the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) report 2 : recipient age, previous abdominal surgery, life support, dialysis 2 times per week before transplantation, portal vein thrombosis, previous liver transplantation, recipient functional status, diagnosis at liver transplant, recipient albumin level, recipient creatinine level, donor age, donation after cardiac death, donor desmopressin, donor diuretics, liver type (partial/split or whole), cold ischemia time, donor height, and recipient hepatitis C virus diagnosis-donor age interaction [(donor age À 50)/10]. Also included were other relevant variables such as the match MELD score, hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) exception status, insurance status, donor race, region, days on the wait list, length of stay after transplantation, and donor risk index (DRI). 3 Differences and trends in recipient and donor characteristics across HHI levels were assessed with the chi-square test (categorical variables), the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (continuous variables), or the Cochran-Armitage trend test. We accounted for multiple comparisons across HHI levels with a Bonferronicorrected P value (P < 0.008; Supporting Table 1 ).
The Kaplan-Meier method was used to estimate observed 1-and 3-year graft and patient survival rates by HHI levels. The posttransplant follow-up status and date were updated with data from the Social Security Death Certificate Master File for patients reportedly alive or lost to follow-up who also had a valid Social Security death date. The time to graft loss was measured in days from liver transplantation to patient death or retransplantation. The time to patient death was measured in days from liver transplantation to patient death. Patients alive or lost to followup were censored at the date of last follow-up (for graft NOTE: Some groups of percentages do not add up to exactly 100 because of rounding. To account for multiple comparisons, only P < 0.008 was considered statistically significant.
*The data are presented as medians and interquartile ranges.
and patient survival), and patients undergoing retransplantation were censored at the date of retransplantation (for patient survival). Survival differences by HHI levels were assessed with a log-rank test with Bonferroni-corrected P values. Univariate and adjusted hazard ratios (HRs) for posttransplant graft and patient survival were calculated for the different HHI levels with a Cox proportional hazards model. The multivariate HRs were adjusted for variables significantly associated with survival in the SRTR reports. We evaluated center-level clustering in the multivariate model. When we accounted for clustering, the HR estimates for the HHI and the statistical significance of graft and patient survival by the HHI remained unchanged with 1 exception: the P value for patient survival in the mid-competition category increased to 0.06 (data not shown). We report here the multivariate model without center-level clustering.
We also examined DSA characteristics, including the HHI, the number of centers, and the transplant and listing practices. The number of liver transplants and the number of new listings per year at DSAs were calculated as means for the study years 2007-2009. Liver transplants and listings per year were adjusted per million population with 2008 census data. Census data for states with county population estimates were obtained from online US census data. 4 Counties were assigned to the DSAs from the SRTR annual organ procurement organization report for the time period Fig. 1 . In Table 1 , we list descriptive statistics for the variables of interest and compare transplant patients by HHI levels. In comparison with transplant patients at centers without competition, a greater proportion of transplant patients at centers with low-, mid-, or high-competition levels were status 1; they were more likely to have match MELD scores greater than 20, HCC or non-HCC exceptions, dialysis in the week before transplantation, a previous liver transplant, life support, a functional status requiring total assistance, and higher albumin levels, and a lower proportion previously underwent abdominal surgeries. Transplant recipients at the mid-and high-competition levels had higher serum creatinine levels in comparison with recipients at the no-competition level. Donors at the low-, mid-, and high-competition levels were generally older (ie, there was a greater proportion of donors ! 60 years old) and included lower proportions of white donors, donors receiving desmopressin, and local organs and greater proportions of donors with DRIs in the upper quartile in comparison with donors at the no-competition level. Patients at the mid-and high-competition levels had greater proportions of partial/split liver transplants and lower proportions of grafts with cold ischemia times less than 9 hours in comparison with patients at the no-competition level. Because of the large number of transplants, relatively small differences may have been statistically significant. Clinically important differences were found in the percentages of patients undergoing transplantation with high MELD scores, with HCC, and on life support or dialysis, in the recipient functional status, in some of the components of the DRI (donor race, older donor age, share type, and cold ischemia time), and in the DRI itself.
We examined the data to determine the degree of elasticity of the data. Using P trends, we found evidence of trends for oldest patient age, MELD scores (except for 6-10), exception scores (HCC and non-HCC), life support, dialysis, recipient functional status, multiple DRI factors, and highest and lowest DRI scores. Table 2 documents the effects of univariate and adjusted multivariate HRs for the risks of graft failure and patient death by HHI levels. The risks of graft failure and patient death were significantly elevated at the low-, mid-, and high-competition levels in comparison with the no-competition level. Despite adjustments for the variables significantly associated with graft survival in the SRTR center-specific reports, the HRs for graft failure and patient death remained significantly different from the HRs of the centers without competition, and this suggested unaccounted-for variance. The matching of high-DRI Figure 2 depicts unadjusted 7-year graft and patient survival. Overall, there was a decrease in the observed graft and patient survival with more competition. The observed 3-year graft and patient survival rates were significantly lower at the low-, mid-, and high-competition levels in comparison with the nocompetition level (P < 0.001). Table 3 demonstrates the DSA categorization by the HHI. The median listings per million population in DSAs differed by the degree of competition within DSAs, with DSAs without competition having significantly fewer listings per million population in comparison with DSAs with mid-and high-competition levels.
DISCUSSION
When we consider competition among transplant centers, we assume that transplant centers desire to perform more liver transplants (ie, gain market share) because of the advantages gained by performing transplants. The presence of more than 1 transplant center in a DSA increases competition among centers for patients and organs, both of which are necessary for gaining market share. Because livers are allocated to the patients on the list by the ranking of their degree of illness (as captured by the MELD score), increased competition would be expected to be associated with higher MELD scores at transplantation. These patients with high MELD scores are more likely to be on life support and on dialysis and to have a worse functional status. Patients with these characteristics have been shown to have higher costs associated with transplantation and lower survival rates after transplantation. Another center strategy for increasing transplantation is to use organs associated with a higher risk of graft failure as measured by the DRI. The use of higher DRI organs is associated with higher transplant costs and worse recipient outcomes. 8 It has also been shown recently that higher DRI organs in patients with higher MELD scores is associated with increased costs. 9 A recent article demonstrated that multiple centers in an organ procurement organization were associated with the use of higher DRI organs, but a measure of market share was not used. 10 We have examined the trends of donor and recipient characteristics (see Table 1 ). The results suggest an elasticity of the effect, particularly in the characteristics by which competition would affect donor and recipient selection at the margin. We cannot argue that there is not some level of a threshold effect, particularly when one is going from no competition to any competition, but there does remain evidence of an association with the HHI, that is, increasing levels of competition and changes in patient and donor selection.
The behavior of performing transplantation for higher risk patients and using higher DRI organs is associated with a decrease in the expected survival of patients at centers with increased competition. When there is no competition, a center may not benefit from performing transplantation with higher DRI organs for patients with higher MELD scores because of the costs associated with this strategy. Because transplant centers typically receive a fixed payment for a transplant from Medicare and private health care payers, a lower cost for transplantation would increase the profits of transplantation. This strategy may result in lower listings per million population by centers without competition, as we have noted in Table 3 . Table 2 documents an association between the level of competition and the HRs of graft and patient survival. The fact that the variables used in the SRTR survival analyses do not account for all of the variance associated with competition is unexpected, and it suggests that unaccounted-for patient, donor, or center characteristics affect these outcomes. One potential explanation is that when there is 1 transplant center per DSA, the transplant center will have all the patients on the list and can turn down an organ for a patient higher on the list if there is the perception of better donor and recipient matching with a patient further down the list without any concern about losing the organ for transplantation to a competitive center. When there are multiple transplant centers per DSA, if a center declines an offer for a patient, this may lead to a competitor using the organ and result in an incremental decrease in the number of transplants at the first center. This ability for a center without competition to match donor and recipient characteristics may be reflected in an unmeasured donor-recipient interaction term that affects patient and graft survival. The presented findings suggest an association between competition (as measured by the HHI) and certain characteristics of patients who are listed and undergo transplantation within a DSA. This does not prove that competition causes the effect but proves only that there is a relationship.
Our finding that the adjusted patient and graft survival rates are lower in DSAs with more competition may be confounded by a number of factors, such as unmeasured donor and recipient characteristics, interactions between donor and recipient characteristics, and differences in medical care.
Competition between liver transplant centers may be looked at in both positive and negative lights. One positive aspect is that competition is associated with increased patient access for sicker patients, who derive the greatest benefit from transplantation. According to the listings per million population, there also appears to be greater access for patients in these DSAs to transplantation. Another positive aspect is that there appears to be increased utilization of higher risk organs by centers in competitive DSAs. Because higher risk organs continued to be discarded in the United States, this usage can be viewed as positive. A negative aspect is that transplantation for higher risk patients and the use of higher risk organs are associated with higher costs, and there is the question whether competition decreases the ability of a center to better match donor and recipient characteristics. Where the correct balance of these positive and negative effects of competition lies is unclear. Competition has been advocated as important for bettering market performance, but these findings suggest that there may be limits to the value of competition in the health care setting. Liver transplantation is a profound and life-saving intervention for patients with end-stage liver disease, but geographic disparities in access to transplantation exist in the United States. [1] [2] [3] [4] Across the country, liver transplantation centers are distributed unevenly throughout the 58 legislatively defined Donor Service Areas (DSAs), which generally serve as the first geographic border for organ allocation and distribution. Coupled with the current organ allocation system, this geographic variation in transplantation center distribution leads to disparities in access to organ transplantation and graft outcomes. [1] [2] [3] [4] As organs are initially allocated within a DSA, considering each DSA as an individual market can be a useful method for understanding transplantation practices and outcomes in the United States.
Market Competition and Density in Liver
Earlier work in transplantation has used the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 5 a measure of market competition used frequently in describing health care markets, to describe competition within a DSA. In kidney transplantation, increased market competition is associated with increased patient mortality and graft failure due to the use of riskier kidneys. 6 Similarly, increased market competition in liver transplantation is associated with variability in listing rates, risk of graft failure, and risk of death. 7 However, this definition of "market" suffers from the large geographic area covered by the DSAs. As yet, the spatial relationship of transplantation centers has not yet been explored. Although market entry is often regulated by certificates of need, it is also true that competition can exist in heavily regulated markets. Increasing market competition and transplantation center density can encourage the use of more marginal organs; as outcomes continue to improve, this might increase access to transplantation.
Studying transplantation centers relative to their spatial organization and density could provide a useful model to better understand the market forces that shape liver transplantation access and outcomes, which in turn could present useful guidance for decisions about either opening new centers or the consolidation of centers. The specific aims of this study were first to determine if there is an association among market competition, transplantation center density, and the number of liver transplants performed; secondarily, we aimed to measure patient and allograft survival in the context of changing transplantation markets. To do this, we used the HHI and the Average Nearest Neighbor (ANN), 8 a measure of spatial density in Geographic Information Systems.
METHODS Liver transplantation markets and characteristics
Data for all adult liver transplants performed in the United States were retrieved between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2012 from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). Transplantation markets were defined initially as the 58 DSAs in the United States; to better approximate the DSAs with preexisting sharing agreements, DSAs were combined for the years that sharing agreements were in effect in New York, Florida, Tennessee, and Ohio. Centers were included if at least one adult deceased donor liver transplantation was performed in a given calendar year. Pediatric hospitals that performed liver transplants in patients older than 18 years of age, who would otherwise be considered adults, were excluded due to relatively small volume and inconsistent practices (some years there would be no transplants, and these centers would appear to "close and open" randomly despite actually being open). Years in which DSAs did not have liver transplantation centers were excluded from the final analysis.
Market characteristics (number of transplantation centers, new listings, deceased organ donors, and the number of liver transplants) were then abstracted for each DSA on an annual basis. The number of donors was counted from all individuals who donated organs, whether or not a liver was actually transplanted from a particular donor. The HHI, 9 a standard measure of market competition, was calculated on an annual basis for each DSA as described in our previous work. 6 In brief, the HHI ranges from 0 to 1. For a monopoly (one transplantation center in a DSA), the HHI ¼ 1, and the more competitive DSAs (with multiple transplantation centers performing a relatively equal number of transplants) have an HHI closer to 1. For modeling, the HHI was inverted such that 0 represents no competition and that 1 is perfect competition; this facilitates interpretation of the regression coefficients as an increased (inverse) HHI translating to "higher competition." When the inverse is presented in models, it is indicated as "inverse HHI."
The Liver Donor Risk Index (LDRI) was calculated for each liver transplanted. 10 An adjusted LDRI was created with the removal of cold ischemia time and organ sharing status to equalize the overall quality number for exported livers, but both measures were used to ensure validity. Annual population for each DSA was obtained by aggregating the US Census intercensal estimates (http://www. census.gov) on an annual basis by counties within a DSA as reported by the SRTR.
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Market density, mixed effects model, and survival analyses To measure spatial organization of transplantation centers, the ANN method in ArcGIS software, version 10.2 (ESRI) was used; this has been used in Geographic Information Systems applications in health care and epidemiology. 8, 12 First, liver transplantation centers were geocoded with BatchGeo (http://www.batchgeo.com). The ANN was then calculated by measuring the average distance to the nearest transplantation center within a DSA for all centers. 13 This distance was then measured against what would be expected (for the average distance between the transplantation centers) given the size of the DSA and tested under a Gaussian distribution. From this, the distribution of centers was categorized as "clustered" (significantly less than expected distances), "random" (unable to reject the null hypothesis), or "dispersed" (significantly longer than expected distances) by the ANN value; single-center DSAs were unable to be measured and were categorized as "single." This was repeated for all 10 years of the study, for a total of 446 observations among the eligible DSAs. Analysis of the market measures was performed in these categories. A mixed linear effects model was created to measure associations between the ANN groups and market factors, and accounted for DSA years with no active adult transplantation centers. All maps were created in ArcGIS software, version 10.2.
A hierarchical negative binomial mixed effects regression model was then built to measure the association between market variables and liver transplants per year in a DSA. This approach was undertaken to identify the key factors to estimate the effect of different market variables. A negative binomial model was chosen after initial models under a Poisson distribution proved to be overdispersed; the conditional variance exceeded the mean and the goodness-of-fit chi-square test was statistically significant (suggesting overdispersion) for all models considered. The market variables were first modeled as a simple negative binomial regression; subsequently, they were then modeled as a hierarchical mixed effects negative binomial regression model with transplantation center and then year as the clustering random effects. The model was built with the intention of keeping all important market variables to test their relationship. The final results are reported as incidence rate ratios (IRRs), which estimate the percent change in incidence of liver transplants on an annual basis, with 95% CI.
Finally, a multivariable Cox proportional hazards model was used to test the relationship between market variables, graft survival, and patient survival. Patientlevel covariates were included in these models to test associations with market factors. Survival was measured through June 4, 2013. For graft survival, patients were censored at death if the graft was still functioning. Effect estimates are presented as hazard ratios (HR) with 95% CI. An a level of 0.05, corresponding to p < 0.05, was used as the criterion for statistical significance. All statistical analyses and data linkages were performed using SAS software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute) and ArcGIS software, version 10.2.
Data source, and Institutional Review Board approval This study used data from the SRTR, which includes data on all donor, wait-listed candidates, and transplant recipients in the United States, submitted by the members of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and has been described elsewhere. The Health Resources and Services Administration, US Department of Health and Human Services provides oversight to the activities of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and SRTR contractors. This study was approved under an exemption by the IRB of Partners HealthCare.
RESULTS
Transplantation center spatial organization is associated with market characteristics During the study period, once the DSAs were combined during sharing agreements and others were excluded, there were 446 observations, or "DSA years" from 45 unique DSAs. There were a total of 21 liver transplantation centers that closed and 9 liver transplantation centers that opened, usually in competitive markets. There was marked variability in terms of market, patient, and transplanted liver characteristics (Table 1) . Once the ANN was calculated for each DSA in every year, there were 150 single-center, 164 clustered, 93 randomly distributed, and 39 dispersed DSA years. Some of the more notable variability was found in the number of new listings for transplants (p ¼ 0.02), number of donors (p ¼ 0.03), number of liver transplants (p ¼ 0.02), and the MELD score at transplantation (p ¼ 0.0005). These p values represent a test for differences between the groups (in a mixed effects linear model); additional pairwise testing was not performed. The distribution of ANN among the DSAs in 2012 is shown on a map of the United States (Fig. 1) .
Market model for prediction of annual transplants A negative binomial mixed effects model was created to measure the association between market factors and the annual number of liver transplants performed in a given DSA ( Table 2) . In univariate analyses, many factors were important, including geography; when compared with the randomly distributed DSAs, dispersed ANN (IRR ¼ 1.96; 95% CI, 1.39-2.77; p ¼ 0.0001) was associated with more transplants. Market competition was not associated with the number of transplants (IRR ¼ 1.08; 95% CI, 0.86-1.37; p ¼ 0.51). Notably, the number of adult liver transplantation centers, competition, singlecenter DSAs, and clustered ANN were not predictive of the number of transplants performed.
The multivariable model (Table 2) was created with the intention of retaining all variables, even if they were not significant on univariate analysis, because of earlier studies noting their importance and their possible impact on the model. In this model, the number of liver transplantation centers became significant (IRR ¼ 1.03; 95% CI, 1.01-1.06; p ¼ 0.04), as did market competition (IRR ¼ 1.33; 95% CI, 1.03-1.69; p ¼ 0.03). A different geographic arrangement by the ANN was associated with the number of transplants: single-center DSAs were associated with a decrease (compared with random distribution; IRR ¼ 0.81; 95% CI, 0.71-0.92; p ¼ 0.001). As a sensitivity analysis, the use of imported organs was included; this impacted results minimally.
Patient and graft survival
Once the market factors were analyzed, we wanted to explore the relationship of those variables with patient mortality and graft failure. The multivariable models were built to adjust for other associated variables with mortality and graft failure (Table 3) . For market variables, there was no association between patient mortality and the number of centers, number of donors, competition, new listings, population, or the ANN. Notable patientlevel factors associated with increased mortality included each additional year of recipient age (HR ¼ 1.02; 95% CI, 1.02-1.03; p < 0.0001), male sex (HR ¼ 1.14; 95% CI, 1.08-1.19; p < 0.0001), increased MELD score at transplantation (HR ¼ 1.02; 95% CI, 1.01-1.03; p < 0.0001), and adjusted LDRI (HR ¼ 1.56; 95% CI, 1.47-1.66; p < 0.0001).
For graft failure, the pattern of association was markedly different, especially with respect to market variables (Table 3 ). Many market variables were now significant, including greater number of transplantation centers (HR ¼ 1.05; 95% CI, 1.01-1.08; p ¼ 0.01), increased competition (HR ¼ 2.17; 95% CI, 1.64-2.86; p < 0.0001), and clustered DSAs by ANN (HR ¼ 1.13; 95% CI, 1.06-1.22; p ¼ 0.0004). Single-center DSAs (HR ¼ 0.73; 95% CI, 0.63-0.84; p < 0.0001) and dispersed DSAs (HR ¼ 0.77; 95% CI, 0.69-0.85; p < 0.0001) were all associated with improved survival. Patient factors followed a similar pattern to the mortality models.
DISCUSSION
This study uses market factors to model the number of liver transplants performed within a DSA in a given year. There was a significant relationship between many market factors and the number of transplants as well as allograft survival, but a differential effect on patient survival after transplantation. Market variables were associated with both patient and graft survival, but, as in our earlier work, market competition also plays a role. To Values are presented as adjusted (multivariable) hazard ratios (HR) and 95% CIs within 2 distinct multivariable models. Follow-up is through June 4, 2013, and is as long as possible for all patients. For graft survival, patients were censored at death if the transplanted liver was still functioning. Otherwise, patients were censored at loss to follow-up or the end of the study period. ANN, Absolute Nearest Neighbor; HHI, Herfindahl Hirschman Index; LDRI, Liver Donor Risk Index, adjusted for cold ischemia time and sharing across Donor Service Areas; MELD, Model for End-Stage Liver Disease.
our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to use a formal measure of geographic density along with market competition to describe the associations between market competition, geography, transplantation volume, and outcomes.
In the multivariable analysis, more transplantation centers and higher competition were associated with more transplants, as were an increased number of new listings and an increase in donors. Higher MELD at transplantation appears to be associated with fewer transplants, which perhaps reflects fewer transplants if sicker patients are listed. The spatial arrangement has an important association in terms of single centers (compared with randomly distributed), but there does appear to be some explanatory power not only due to center size but also center density. Higher LDRI was strongly associated with more transplants; this is also intuitively true and provides an internal check for the model: riskier livers mean that the marginal (in both the clinical and economic sense) livers are being used to perform more transplants. In summary, several variables are important, and there is likely a role for spatial organization in specifying these models.
The hierarchical modeling takes advantage of the repeated measurements to build a robust estimate of the relative contributions of changing market factors. Although it might seem intuitive that more liver transplantation centers would conduct more transplants, it might not necessarily be true, given a relatively fixed organ supply (Table 2) . Modeling like this allows some predictive insight into what might happen should the current DSAs change their composition. We would suggest that increased competition, through more even distribution of liver transplants among centers or center density, is associated with an increased use of livers. Although this association is not strictly causal, it is a reasonable pathway to consider. These might be of lower quality overall, but as outcomes improve, it appears to be better than the alternative of no transplantation at all.
Transplantation of livers, although expensive, has dramatic effects on quality of life and survival. Although quality of life cannot be considered directly from registry data, interesting differential effects were seen on patient mortality and graft failure after transplantation. Market variables did not appear to matter very much in terms of mortality, once adjusted for patient characteristics. This is not inconsistent with Halldorson and colleagues, 7 who reported that the findings of competition did impact graft and patient survival adversely. This is likely due to different factors considered, as well as measuring the HHI annually. Although our model does account for some of the short-and long-term implications of changing competition, there is a possibility that some DSAs are saturated with respect to competition and could not support new entrants, but rather more evenly distributed transplants.
Interesting differences arise, however, on the consideration of graft failure. Patient factors do come into play, as expected. Incorporating geography into a market model of competition makes these findings somewhat difficult to interpret, but it would appear that more dense, competitive areas appear to have negative impacts on graft outcomes due to use of lower-quality organs (as demonstrated in our earlier work). However, given the alternatives to liver transplantation for the sickest patients, the use of lower-quality organs can still confer benefit. This emphasizes the need for a geographic understanding of a "market" in transplantation, because where transplantation centers and where patients live impacts access to transplantation, 2, 14 and likely affects outcomes in complex ways that are only beginning to be understood. It is also likely that an optimal balance exists in liver transplantation; this framework is an additional method to consider both competition and geography, which should be considered because neither the locations of transplantation centers nor the borders of the DSA were chosen in an efficient manner.
Our study is not without limitations. The ANN is a useful measure of clustering and dispersion, but it is sensitive to the area of the DSA, rather than the actual population served or the demand for liver transplantation. The DSA might not be perfectly representative of a market and its definition is somewhat muddled by the sharing agreements that occur more often in liver transplantation, but it serves as a useful approximation of markets for an organ and organ allocation. Because these models are complex, isolating these factors to make direct comparisons with real DSAs is difficult. Alternative parameterizations, such as using the HHI categorically, were considered, but unfortunately were not used because the category of monopoly (inverse HHI ¼ 0) and singlecenter DSAs were perfectly correlated in multivariable models. These limitations notwithstanding, the current study is a novel analysis of market competition and geographic density as factors in determining the number of liver transplants performed annually.
CONCLUSIONS
More liver transplantation centers were associated with more liver transplants, and these market factors had complex interactions with patient and graft survival after transplantation. From the patient perspective, market variables impact patient and graft survival, but baseline comorbidities remain important. Background. Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) are currently evaluated on donation rates and number of organs per donor. However, there is significant variability in market characteristics which affect transplant programs' donor organ acceptance practices and OPOs' ability to successfully place higher risk organs. The impact of transplant market characteristics on OPO performance metrics has not been evaluated. Methods. The OPO performance measures were correlated annually with the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, a standard measure of market competition for centers within the OPO donor service areas from 2003 to 2011. Results. More competitive donor service areas were associated with increased number of donors (P = 0.01) and eligible deaths (P < 0.001). Market competition was associated with increased use of high Donor Risk Index for kidney (P = 0.03) and liver (P = 0.01) allografts. The OPOs with increased competition in liver transplant also were noted to have a higher donor conversion rate (P < 0.001), more donors per million population (P < 0.001), and a higher utilization rate for liver allografts (P = 0.007). Conclusions. These data suggest that proposals to increase district size to increase competition among transplant programs could result in improved organ utilization over time by incentivizing the use of marginal donor organs and increasing access to transplantation.
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H ealth care market characteristics have been demonstrated to have a significant impact on practice and utilization patterns, resulting in marked variation in cost, quality, and outcomes across geographic regions. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] In transplantation, geographic variation among healthcare delivery regions has been well documented in organ supply, listing practices, waitlist mortality, and organ utilization. [6] [7] [8] [9] The 58 donor service areas (DSAs) in the United States are the initial unit of allocation for available organs; each is served by a single organ procurement organization (OPO), although the number of transplant programs served and size of the covered population varies markedly. 10 Transplant center behavior listing and organ acceptance practice differ significantly in response to the number of competitors and the degree of market share controlled by each center within the DSA as quantified using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). 11, 12 The HHI is a measure of market competition used to describe healthcare markets that account for both the number and distribution of patients among centers. In highly competitive DSAs, patients and organs are shared relatively evenly across many transplant centers, whereas noncompetitive DSAs have a small number of dominant centers. Increased competition has been associated with greater transplant activity, acceptance of higher risk donor organs, and marginally decreased posttransplant outcomes in both kidney 11, 13 and liver 12, 14 transplantations. In response to the ongoing organ shortage, national authorities have focused increasing scrutiny on the performance of OPOs, which are responsible for evaluation, recovery, and placement of deceased donor organs. Organs are allocated based on national policy. In general, organs are first offered to local centers, then regionally, and, finally, nationally in an effort to identify a program willing to accept the organ. Although organ acceptance is largely out of the control of the OPO, transplant center acceptance practices have a marked impact on the number of organs transplanted per donor, the primary measure of OPO effectiveness. 15, 16 Organ procurement organizations are not captive to local centers and can offer organs to other regional and national centers; however, this practice may be more difficult as a result of logistical complexity, higher cost, and longer cold ischemic times inherent in sharing organs more broadly. Understanding how transplant market characteristics are related to OPO metrics may inform policy development as well as OPO quality and performance evaluation.
The degree of market competition within the DSA is heavily influenced by geographic boundaries established in the 1980s to facilitate organ donation and is completely out of the control of the OPO. These boundaries were not designed to include equivalent populations nor density of transplant programs. However, OPO performance is assessed based on national standards without adjustment for local market conditions which may impact organ acceptance practices. To assess the impact of market competition on measures of OPO performance, OPO performance metrics and transplanted organ characteristics for liver and kidney transplantation were correlated with the DSA's HHI. To further quantify the impact of increasing competition through broader sharing of organs, the impact of doubling the degree of competition on donor utilization was calculated annually for each DSA for both kidney and liver transplantation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Patient Cohort And Definitions
Measures of organ utilization and market competition were derived from a cohort of donors and all adult recipients (18 years 
Market Competition
The HHI was calculated on an annual basis for both kidney and liver transplantation in each DSA with active adult transplant centers. The HHI is calculated by taking the sum of the market shares squared. 2, 17 The market share for each transplant center was defined as the percentage of transplants performed by a given center within a DSA (expressed as a decimal). For the purposes of this analysis, living donor transplants were counted only in the calculation of market share to provide an overall description of the competitive milieu, consistent with prior work. 11, 12 For example, a DSA with 1 center would have an HHI of 1 = (1.00) . In the typical calculation, an HHI of 1 represents a monopoly (1 transplant center performing all transplants), and the closer the HHI is to 0, the closer to perfect competition (many transplant centers performing a relatively equal number of transplants). Because this reverses the direction of competition (a higher HHI indicates lower competition), the scale is presented as inverted around 0.5 so that a higher inverse HHI indicates greater competition.
To test the robustness of our conclusions, the associations between HHI and organ utilization were also analyzed nonparametrically based on the number of transplant centers.
Additionally, sharing agreements were taken into consideration for both kidney and liver in accordance to our prior work. 18, 19 The sharing agreements minimally affected the overall conclusions. Because treating those agreements separately would confound the joint analysis of kidney and liver transplantation, those results are not presented here.
Outcome Measures
Organ utilization and discard rates were calculated from donor data provided in the SRTR Standard Analysis File. Organs were considered discarded if they were recovered but not transplanted. The conversion rate was obtained from publicly reported data on the SRTR website (http://www. srtr.org). It was calculated by dividing the number of actual donors by the number of eligible deaths and were obtained from publicly reported data on the SRTR website The definition of eligible death is narrow enough (available at http:// www.srtr.org/csr/current/Centers/201311/all_opo_docu-mentation.pdf) such that this number is often smaller than the total number of donors in a DSA.
The Kidney Donor Risk Index (KDRI) 20 and Liver Donor Risk Index (LDRI) 21 were used to characterize organ quality and the risk of graft failure. An adjusted LDRI was created with the average cold ischemia time for the region and a local share, as the effects of livers being declined locally was of interest.
Associations with competition were tested with linear mixed effects models (random slopes and intercepts for each DSA); these were used to account for the year-to-year variability associated with changes in local market competition within a DSA. Because the individual unit changes of HHI can be difficult to interpret, the HHI was converted to a log 2 base. 22, 23 The coefficients from these regressions thus represent the predicted change with a doubling of competition within a DSA. with a median inverse HHI of 0.50 (0.28-0.70) compared with liver markets with a median inverse HHI of 0.28 (0.00-0.49). When DSAs had both kidney and liver transplant centers, there was a strong degree of correlation between market competition for both organs: β = 0.39 ± 0.06 (P < 0.001) when single-center OPOs were included, and β = 0.53 ± 0.11 (P < 0.001) when single-center OPOs were excluded. The degree of market competition across the country is shown in Figure 1 for both kidney (A) and liver (B) transplantation.
Relationship Between Competition And Measures Of OPO Performance Metrics
Competition within the DSA was strongly associated with OPO performance measures. In kidney transplantation (Table 2) , increased competition was associated with a higher number of eligible deaths per million (P < 0.001) and a higher overall mean KDRI in both locally accepted organs (P = 0.03) and imported kidneys (P = 0.04). For liver transplantation (Table 3) , more competitive DSAs were associated with a higher number of donors per million, conversion rate, livers transplanted per donor, percent of donation after cardiac death livers, mean LDRI, local LDRI, imported adjusted LDRI (referring to organs imported to the DSAs), waiting time (measured as mean deceased donor waiting time measured from waitlist entry), match model for end stage liver disease (MELD), new listings per 100 000, and percent of transplants with MELD of greater than 30 (P < 0.01 for all comparisons). Competition was associated with a slightly lower number of livers recovered per donor (P = 0.004), suggesting a more The effect estimates reflect a doubling of competition (as measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index) in a DSA and the respective outcomes. Estimates are derived from hierarchical linear mixed effects models clustered at the DSA/OPO level for each of the 10 years in the study. Imported adjusted LDRI refers to organs imported to the DSA. Waiting time reflects mean deceased donor waiting time measured from waitlist entry.
aggressive pursuit of marginal donors (eg, donation after cardiac death) that yield only kidneys. After removing singlecenter DSAs from the analysis, the effect estimates remained similar in terms of significance, but were often of larger magnitude (Tables 2 and 3 ).
Overall competition was associated with greater demand for organs leading to variation in donor characteristics and organ quality. In kidney transplant, competitive DSA had longer waiting times and higher KDRIs at transplant (Figures 2A  and B) . Similarly, median MELD at transplant and LDRI increased in more competitive DSAs ( Figures 3A and B) .
DISCUSSION
In this analysis, we demonstrate an association between DSA competition and OPO performance. It is clear that some of these measures are significantly influenced by utilization patterns of the centers within the DSA, which are out of the direct control of the OPO. The OPO performance is frequently assessed based on the number of organs transplanted per donor. Organs transplanted per donor is a complex metric, depending partially on the procurement by the OPO and then eventual utilization and transplantation by centers with the DSA that the OPO serves. Although OPO processes, such as donor evaluation, family discussions, donor management, and other activities, have a significant effect on this metric, this study demonstrates the notable impact of local transplant market characteristics on utilization. There is a highly statistically significant relationship between the HHI in the DSA and measures of organ recovery and utilization, including number of organs per donor and use of marginal donors.
Market competition appears to influence transplant listing and organ acceptance practices both at the transplant center and DSA level. The competitive milieu varies widely across the United States (Figure 1) , with some regions served by only 1 large transplant program. Increasing competition creates a "seller's market" for deceased donor organs, allowing the OPOs to be more aggressive in placement. The effect is more easily seen in liver transplantation, where almost all measures suggest that competition is associated with greater organ recovery and more transplantation. This is consistent with prior work in liver transplant market competition and the DSA: with higher competition, more transplants occurred, driven largely by the use of higher LDRI organs and increased listing of patients per million population. 12 Similarly, in kidney transplantation, increased market competition was associated with higher mean KDRI and longer waiting lists, 11 and despite considerable variation across the country, these higher listing rates are associated with lower dialysis and posttransplant mortality. 9 The strength of association appears to be greater in liver transplantation, which may reflect FIGURE 2. Market competition was associated with increased length of time on the waitlist for kidney transplantation (A, P = 0.002). Higher median MELD at transplant was associated with increasing market competition (B, P = 0.03).
FIGURE 3.
Market competition is associated with a higher donor risk index for both kidney (A, P = 0.02) and liver (B, P = 0.03) transplantation.
greater time constraints of placing organs in distant centers. Conversely, ischemic time and procurement assessment are less consequential for renal transplant, allowing for larger "markets" for recovered organs. This suggests that improved utilization of available allografts could be accomplished by increasing competition for the available organ supply before recovery to minimize ischemic times.
The discard of potentially viable liver allografts remains a significant issue, particularly in less competitive DSAs. One approach to increase competition is to simply increase the number of transplant programs being considered for local allocation of organs. This can be directly accomplished by the approval of new transplant programs, or indirectly, through broader sharing of organs which de facto increases competition and appears to reduce organ discard. The implementation of Share 35 for liver transplantation resulted in greater competition for liver allografts through regional sharing for patients with patients with greater severity of illness (higher MELD). In their initial evaluation of the impact of Share 35, Massie et al 24 identified an increase in the number of liver transplants, fewer discards, and lower waitlist mortality. These findings are consistent with those predicted from the present analysis. Although the intent of Share 35 was primarily to reduce waitlist death through the transplant patients with higher MELD, the policy change was also beneficial for the OPOs by increasing organ utilization, particularly of marginal allografts.
The impact of market competition on the efficiency of transplantation is complex. Greater competition is associated with longer waiting times and a higher MELD at transplantation. This association may reflect the need to list and support patients with greater severity of illness to "compete" for organs in competitive regions. Although these patients may have slightly worse outcomes than patients with a lower MELD, they have a high net benefit from transplant because their waitlist mortality is significant. 25 Prior work would suggest that encouraging the use of more marginal organs has such substantial benefit that will result in a greater number of transplant procedures. Indeed, organ donation (as measured by donors per million population) was noted to be higher in Spain than in the United States, due to greater utilization of elderly (greater than 70 years of age) donors, rather than the need to rely on presumed consent. 26 Thus, policies that increase local demand for marginal livers have the potential to increase the utilization of the potential deceased donor organ supply.
These data also suggest that appropriate models for performance metrics in OPO donation should incorporate the characteristics of the local DSA. Donors per million has been previously demonstrated not to be an accurate way of quantifying OPO performance due to wide variation in the characteristics of the population served by nation's DSAs, 15, 16 and it is difficult to determine expected rates given the inherent variation in potential donor socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, and underlying modality of death. Calculation of the organs per donor and conversion rates are similarly limited by differences in cultural, racial, and demographic characteristics. Current adjustment models (available at http://www.srtr.org/csr/current/modtabs_opo.aspx) for organ yield do not account for the behavior of local centers, which is particularly significant in low-competition DSAs. Given the accumulating evidence that center listing and organ acceptance practices affect organ utilization, we suggest that the addition of market characteristics to risk adjustment models would facilitate comparison between OPOs. 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] 27 Accurate and valid measurement of OPO performance is crucial because poor performance results in citation by the Membership and Professional Standards Committee at United Network for Organ Sharing and, potentially, to closure of the OPO and transfer of the territory to another entity.
This study has several potential limitations. Registry data are imperfect, but it is largely accurate with the relationship to key clinical and demographic factors. Using the HHI as a measure of market competition within a DSA can also be challenging because of patient movement between DSAs and difference in geography and travel times between OPOs. In addition, transplant center practice may change overtime due to factors beyond center competition. Furthermore, the impact of local competition may be diminished following the passage of Share 35 and the new kidney allocation system which includes regional sharing for kidneys with a Kidney Donor Profile Index greater than or equal to 85%. 28 Additionally, this analysis is not designed to address how the current SRTR performance assessment models would change if competition was considered; this is a direction for future work. Despite these limitations, our study provides the first quantification of the relationship between market competition and OPO performance metrics.
In conclusion, the relationship between OPO performance and efficiency is associated with competition within the local DSA. This association was consistent over time and for both kidney and liver. Greater competition was associated with both an increased the number of donors per capita as well as more efficient utilization of marginal organs. Although increased sharing for selected organ types is likely to increase the number of marginal organs used per donor, broad redistricting would increase competition and may be a viable manner to improve OPO performance, particularly in regions which currently have very few transplant programs within the local DSA. Finally, OPO performance metrics should be adjusted to reflect the characteristics of the DSA that they serve. Going forward, it will be important to understand the different incentives and tradeoffs induced by increased competition for organs within a DSA.
